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Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan*
Raoul Motika
1 The “Search for Identity” is a common feature of ex-Socialist societies in transition. Like
in other republics of the former Soviet Union the dissolution of the communist system
left  the Azerbaijani  society in an unexpected economic and sometimes humanitarian
catastrophe. At the same time, the need for a reassessment of the country's past and
present emerged in society. It goes without saying that religion, i.e. Islam, could and,
according to many local intellectuals, should play an important role in the formation of
the Azerbaijani nation.1 Moreover, many common people showed an increasing interest
in their formerly condemned Islamic roots and turned towards religion, some even by
joining religious networks,  in order to find spiritual  as  well  as  material  relief  to get
through the hard times2.
2 The framework in which I would like to present some aspects of Islam in present-day
Southern Caucasia is mainly defined by the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan.  In
contrast to the opinion that Islam displays a more or less uniform character in all former
Muslim Soviet  republics,  it  is  true to say that  in these countries  Islam was basically
shaped  by  the  specific  circumstances  of  each  republic,  rather  than  by  international
Islamic movements and trends. This is particularly true in the case of Azerbaijan.
3 We may assume that at present about 93% out of more than 7.5 million Azerbaijanis have
a Muslim background and from this  majority 65% to 75% are connected with Shi'ite
traditions3.
4 Azeri Turks form by far the largest Muslim ethnic group in Azerbaijan and belong mostly
to the Twelver Shi'ite branch of Islam (about 75%)4. Next come the Lesgins, Talysh, Tatars,
Kurds, Tats, Meskhets and some smaller Caucasian ethno-linguistic groups; historically all
of them, except the Talysh and some Kurds and Tats, were Sunnites (belonging to the
Hanafi  school)5.  Although  religious  knowledge  is,  for  the  most  part,  very  poor,  the
inhabitants of the different regions of the country have preserved a memory of their
Shi'ite or Sunnite background on varying levels.
5 According to a quite reliable survey, 4% to 6% of the population may be called “active”
believers, which means that they obey the various Islamic regulations of behaviour; 87%
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to 92% do consider themselves as Muslims, but comply with only a (quite often little) part
of  the  religious  regulations.  Only  about  3% call  themselves  atheists6.  In  general,  the
degree of religiosity is higher in some Shi'ite regions, i.e. in Southern Azerbaijan and on
the  Apsheron  Peninsula  (Baku  and  its  outskirts)  than  in  those  areas  inhabited  by
Sunnites; it is also higher in towns than in the countryside. Islamic marriage and funeral
rites are widely followed whereas active participation in Muharram mourning is not that
common despite a quite impressive number of visitors to the mosques during religious
festivals.
6 Whereas in 1976 there were 16 registered mosques and one mädräsä (Islamic school) in
Azerbaijan, there were at the end of the Soviet period already about 200 mosques7, and
until today  this  figure  has  increased  explosively  to  more  than  1,300  mosques8,
innumerable  Islamic  schools,  a  working  Islamic  university,  another,  financed  by  the
Saudis, in preparation and a Turkish sponsored İlâhiyat Fakü-Itesi.The phenomenon of a
“religious renaissance”, taking place in parallel with a “national rebirth” or “birth”, is a
fact which cannot be ignored.
7 Of special interest is the fact that Shi'ism as well as the common Azeri-Turkish ethno-
linguistic background relates the Azerbaijani Azeri Turks closely to their brethren in Iran.
The close relationship between both Azeri populations is not only based on their common
language and a common Shi'ite background, but also built on a culture influenced by
centuries of Iranian cultural dominance.
8 However, since Iran's loss of hegemony over the khanates north of the Aras river due to
the advance of Czarist Russia at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Azeris of
that region have gradually developed several features differentiating them from the Azeri
population of Iran. While a secularisation and Turkifization process gained momentum in
Russian Azerbaijan, Shi'ite Islam remained the dominating superstructure, along with an
intensification of Irano-Persian cultural influence in Iranian Azerbaijan. A crucial period
in this respect was the time of the Stalinist and the Pahlavi regimes, which isolated the
two Azerbaijans from each other quite effectively9. The decisive historical event which
fundamentally changed the relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan was the tearing
down of the “Iron Curtain” in the winter of 1990 when the border fortifications were
pulled down by the people of Nakhichevan.
9 The pre-Soviet and Soviet processes of secularisation in Azerbaijan led to the general
acceptance of a secular political and juridical system as well as a lay system of education.
So,  Islamic  identity  is  a  part  of,  or  even subordinate  to  a  mainly  non-religious  self-
definition which is not only the product of Soviet nationality policy, but has much deeper
roots. Secularisation and modernisation in Azerbaijan have their origins in the second
half of the XIXth century, when Caucasian Muslims confronted with Czarist colonialism
and growing Armenian nationalism started to re-define themselves and began to fight for
a better position for their community. The slogan “Turkism, Modernisation and Islam”
originating from Musavat, the leading party of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan
(1918-1920) stands for its own. Today, the debate about the exact meaning of “Turkism”,
which  some  see  as  a  Pan-Turkish  ideology  opposed  to  “Azerbaijanism”  and  others
interpret  as  Azerbaijani  nationalism  only  imbedded  into  a  greater  Turkic  cultural
context, still continues. Obviously, Islam plays a crucial role in that vision, but only in
third place.
10 While  most  Azerbaijanis  regard  Islam  as  being  part  of  their  national  identity,  any
intermingling  of  religion  with  the  political  sphere,  however,  is  rejected  by  the  vast
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majority of the population. On the other hand, one should not ignore the fact that Islamic
traditions and beliefs are often an integral part of everyday life, but are primarily seen as
national, not religious traditions. During the Soviet period religious praxis largely became
individualised, e.g. the belief in magical practices became a widespread phenomenon and
pilgrimages  to  the  numerous  holy  shrines were  and  still  are  very  popular10.  This
development is directly connected to the destruction of the clerical structures during the
atheist campaigns of the twenties and the brutal Stalinist purges of the thirties. Since
1928 Soviet  Azerbaijanis  have also been isolated from the Shi'ite centres of  religious
learning in Iran and Iraq. As a consequence, in the middle of the 1980s the number of
official  mullahs  throughout  Azerbaijan  was  estimated  at  50-70  men11.  Those  had  a
comparatively low level of theological expertise caused by the restrictions on the Islamic
institutions  of  learning  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Therefore,  Shi'ite  Azerbaijan  could  not
develop a religious hierarchy comparable to Iran or Iraq with Ayatollahs or even a marjac-
i taqlīd ('source for emulation') at the top, a fact which in future will automatically lead to
a growing orientation towards Qom, Najaf and other places of Shi'ite higher learning.
11 The so-called unofficial Islam was too heterogeneous a phenomenon to play as such any
decisive role. Most of the unofficial mullahs were private individuals with some religious
knowledge and/or a religious family background. However, some of these religious men
could gain political power in a number of traditional suburbs of Baku on the Apsheron
Peninsula between 1988 and 1993,  when the communist  system broke down and the
national-democratic People's Front ruled for about one difficult year. These were also the
years  when  Iranian  clerics  and  missionaries  appeared  in  great  numbers  all  over
Azerbaijan set about helping to restore religious life in the country and influencing the
future  shape  of  Islam  in  Azerbaijan12.  They  tried  to  use  this  period  of  change  and
instability, which was also a time of great curiosity about Islam, to build the basis for
further agitation and influence. But 180 years of Czarist and Soviet rule as well as local
traditions  laid  a  very  strong  foundation  for  a  distinctive  perspective  of  Islam  in
Azerbaijan. And as nationalism in Azerbaijan is very much based on the specific idea of
Turkism, Iran, despite the common Shi'ite background, could not serve as a model for a
national  state  combining  ethno-nationalism  with  Islam.  The  Iranian  revolution  of
1979-1980 perceived as an example for the mobilising power of Islam against a secular
regime, however, exerted considerable influence by giving Azerbaijani religious activists
self-confidence vis-a-vis the communist oppression. But, the Islamic Republic could never
hope  to  get  very  far  with  its  aspirations.  First,  because  of  the  completely  different
structure of  the Azerbaijani  society from the Iranian one,  e.g.  the nonexistence of  a
comparable clergy independent  from the state.  Second,  because of  the different  role
religion  plays  in  each  country  and  third  because  of  the  bad  reputation  Iran  has  in
Azerbaijan. The causes for this bad reputation are numerous, only to mention some: the
Islamic Republic of Iran is perceived mainly as oppressor of the Azeri brethren living
across the Aras river, even worse than the Soviet Union; the good relationship between
the Islamic Republic and Armenia, Azerbaijan's arch enemy in the Karabagh war; years of
anti-Iranian propaganda by the Soviet media;  and the unattractiveness of the Iranian
model.  Insofar,  copying  the  Iranian  model  was  never  a  realistic  option  for  the
Azerbaijanis. Even Iran's close ally in Azerbaijan, the Islamic Party, sees no chance for the
establishment of velāyat-e faqīh in Azerbaijan in foreseeable future13.
12 When Heydär  Äliyev  came to  power  in  summer  1993,  he  restored  order  and finally
expelled most of the Iranian missionaries with the exception of some mullahs working in
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refugee camps financed by Iran. Therefore the direct influence of Iranian mullahs on
Azerbaijani believers is very limited and generally channelled through local pro-Iranian
religious functionaries. Moreover, we ought not to forget that a considerable number of
the higher Shi'ite clergy in Iran does not accept the idea of a theocratic regime and
therefore  when  an  Azerbaijani  believer  chooses  a  certain  Iranian  (or  Iraqi)  Great
Ayatollah as spiritual  leader,  this does not necessarily mean that he or she backs an
Islamist political stance.
13 As for the normative framework of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the laws regarding religion
are quite clear. In Article 6 of the constitution, Azerbaijan is declared a secular state. This
point is driven home in Article 19 with the statement of the separation of religion and
state and the equality of all religions before the law as well as the secular character of the
state educational system. In Article 37 religious freedom is proclaimed for individuals and
groups. But,  in principle all  associations,  both religious and non-religious, have to be
registered by the state, although this was more or less a formality until 1997. Because of
the  activities  of  foreign,  Christian-evangelical  as  well  as  fundamentalist  Islamic,
missionaries  and  because  of  the  dynamic  spreading  of  religious  groups,  in  1996  the
Azerbaijani Parliament adopted an amendment to the law ‘On Religious Faith’ banning
the activities of foreign missionaries14.  In autumn 1997 the government demanded re-
registration of all religious communities requiring the approval by “traditional religious
organisations”.  This  was  extremely  difficult  for  certain  groups15.  For  this  restrictive
policy the Russian and Armenian religious laws may have served as a model. According to
these laws so-called “non-historical religious communities” have no chance for official
registration. Theoretically, for all Islamic organisations asking for registration approval
by the semi-official  “Administration of  the Caucasian Muslims” (Qafqazya Müsülmanlar
İdaräsi; hereafter: QMİ) is mandatory. For obvious reasons the QMİ strongly opposes all
religious groups which want to stay independent and might emerge as its rivals. As long
as these unregistered groups keep a low profile the state apparatus, however, does not
show the slightest interest in actively impeding them16.
14 Parallel to the leaders of other CIS-republics the Azerbaijani state leadership tries to use
religion  to  strengthen its  legitimacy.  This  is  e.g. demonstrated  by  President  Äliyev's
widely celebrated hajj, Koran recitations during political festivities and the incorporation
of religious holidays into the official calendar17. Besides some tiny successor organisations
to the Communist Party, all other political parties, pro-government and opposition alike,
pay lip service to Islam in one form or another, claiming that religion is part of their
national identity as Muslim Azerbaijani Turks. Main components of this identity are the
Azeri-Turkish language and the idea of a common history as well as a set of cultural
norms stemming from the Islamic background. Thus, Islam is tightly bound up with the
idea of an Azerbaijani nation which is part of the Turkic and Islamic world. Hence, it is
not astonishing that the fact of nominally being Muslim served as a marker of difference
to distinguish themselves from the nominally Christian Armenians during the bloody
conflict  about  Nagorno  Karabagh  (the  same  is  true  for  the  constructed  Armenian
identity). This assumption, however, should not lead us to interpret a mainly territorial
conflict as a religious one.
15 Another  remarkable  fact  is  that  during  the  Soviet  period  the  relational  patterns  of
women and Islam changed considerably: since women were hardly represented in the
male dominated Islamic hierarchy and men were much more integrated into the Soviet
system,  the destruction of  the Islamic structures strengthened the role of  women as
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guardians of religious tradition. In pre-Soviet times women traditionally expressed their
religiousness  mostly  in  private  which  after  the  Bolshevikis’  takeover  of  the  country
helped  them  to  escape  persecution.  As  a  result  women  more  than  men  became
safeguardians  and  conveyers  of  religious  knowledge  (often  in  a  rudimentary  form).
Therefore holy places are mainly visited by women and some women even function as
“female mullahs”, a few even did before in Soviet times18.
16 Thus, on the basis of my assumption that the face of contemporary Islam in Azerbaijan is
basically shaped by the Soviet past, I want to present five different layers of Islam in
Azerbaijan.
17 First layer: the official hierarchy renamed after 1989 from Zaqafqaziya Müsälmanlari Ruhani
İdaräsi (“Spiritual Board of the Transcaucasian Muslims”) to Qafqazya Müsülmanlar İdaräsi
(“Administration  of  the  Caucasian  Muslims”)  and  since  1980  headed  by  the  Shi'ite
ŞeyhülislamHacı  Allahşükür  Paşazadä  with  a  Sunnite  deputy,  the  Müftü Haci  Äläskär
Musayev, representing the 30-plus percentage of people with a Sunni background living
in the Republic. The authority of the institution theoretically extends over all Shi'ites of
the CIS and the Sunnites of all Caucasian areas. In reality its influence is limited mainly to
the Muslims of Georgia, Shi'ite Azeris as well as Sunnite Adjars, and the Shi'ite Azeris of
Daghestan. Besides,  the Şeyhülislamis head of the Qafqazya Xalqlar Äli  Din Şurası (“High
Religious Council of the Caucasian Peoples”, founded 1993) consisting of representatives
of the Islamic as well as of the Christian hierarchies.
18 The QMİ is, in theory, controlled by a regionally elected body of 25 Qazis, the so-called
Qazilär Şurasi. There have been no elections held for years now and even the Şeyhülislam
and the whole governing body of the administration should have been the subject of an
election for several years now. That these elections have been postponed year after year
indicates the complicated situation the official hierarchy is facing due to its bad image as
an organisation, controlled by the KGB during the Soviet years, about which also rumours
of  corruption  are  going  around.  By  many  believers  the  Şeyhülislamis  regarded  as  an
opportunist because he welcomed every single political change during the last 15 years
with the same degree of enthusiasm. When President Äliyev tries to show his respect to
religion, he is using the leadership of the QMİ by calling them to deliver some prayers
before his speeches on the occasion of a religious holiday. But, this attitude of the QMİ
leadership could also be interpreted as neutral behaviour towards the political power and
acceptance of the supremacy of politics over the clerical structures, thus reflecting the
framework set by the constitution.
19 At present the QMİ seeks to extend its influence and to broaden its material basis. In 1999
there were some 1,300 Mosques in Azerbaijan of which about 1000 were under direct
supervision of the QMİ19. This process was backed by the state and positively influenced
by  the  possibility  of  channelling  foreign  financial  and  material  aid  through  the
Institution's networks. But, in practice the mosques have to finance themselves; thus,
most of the income of the local mosques still stems from fees rendered to them by the
population for marriage and funeral services20. In this context it is understandable that
foreign mullahs and imams are unwelcome competitors for the scarce resources. In this
struggle an important tool of control is the question of official registration of religious
organisations by the state. In this matter the QMİ was able to get the right of veto from
the state, at least with regard to Islamic institutions. A step which greatly enhanced its
position.  The situation is  being complicated by the fact  that  a  former deputy of  the
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Şeyhülislam,Hacı Sabir, who is now Rector of the İslam Universiteti,is at loggerheads with
Allahşükür Paşazadä.
20 The Islam Universiteti (a former mädräsä gaining its university status in 1992) was founded
with the aim of preparing a new generation of well-educated mullahs to replace the self-
declared ones. Another important goal is to become less dependant on sending religious
students  abroad  for  their  Islamic  education.  Intentionally  or  unintentionally  the
education  of  Azerbaijani  clergymen  abroad  shapes  their  future  Weltsicht (vision  du
monde) and may serve as an important channel for influences alien to local traditions. In
1996 about 120 Azerbaijani  students officially studied theology mainly in Egypt,  Iran,
Libya and Syria (in each country 25-45); only a handful in Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan. Most of them received grants from the governments or from organisations/
foundations of their host countries. At present about 200 mostly male students study at
the Islam University the traditional Islamic sciences, world history and foreign languages
(Persian and English). Except for thefiqh-classes there exist no different curricula for Shi'a
and Sunni students. As explained by an official of the University, the high tuition fees are,
despite the economic misery and the low wages of the students’  parents,  no obstacle
because of the good prospects for the graduates to get a post at a mosque. Since the
appointment to a mosque or the taking over of a mosque from somebody else opens
considerable  possibilities  for  revenues  gained  by  collecting  the  fees  for  marriage
contracts as well as for funeral services, the competition in this field may be strong in the
future.
21 In regard to the religious ideology, the Board and the official Islamic University are trying
to develop a national Azerbaijani brand of Islam by diminishing Shi'a-Sunni differences
and fighting  against  foreign missionaries  under  the pretext  of  keeping the  so-called
unique peaceful coexistence of both branches of Islam. Azerbaijan may be the sole Islamic
country where adherents of both sects pray together in the same mosque21, sometimes
even led by the same mullah performing both prayer rites.
22 Representatives of this institution take part in the country's Älmi İslam Şurasi(‘Scientific
Islamic Council’)  comprising of  academics  as  well  as  of  religious  functionaries.  Some
members  of  this  body of  about  23  members,  which is  seeking to  develop a  national
religious policy, publish commentaries and interpretations of important questions like
the  compulsory  nature  of  the  Islamic  law and  the  status  of  women.  Some  of  these
interpretations are innovative and reform-minded.
23 When it comes to politics, the leaders of the QMİ pay their lip-service to the principle of a
secular state, but demand at the same time the adoption of Islam as state religion, the
integration of Islamic law into the legal system and try to widen the influence of Islam in
the public sphere.
24 The most important competitor for funds is the second layer of Azerbaijani Islam – Popular
Religiosity. A spectacular example for this is the Ziyarätgah of Ät Aqa in Şövälan on the
fringes of Baku. In 1992 a certain Hacı Nizam occupied the place to put everything in a
proper order as he proclaimed.  The shrine earns millions of  Manats (the Azerbaijani
currency) through a steady stream of pilgrims to the place. So, Hacı Nizam could afford to
build really impressive buildings and feeds hundreds of poor people every day, a fact
which secures him a large following. Up to now he could defend his position against the
claims of the QMİ. This can mean that he has some protection by the ruling elite – perhaps
because he shares the income of the shrine with them as some people spread around. It is
Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan
Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 115 | 2009
6
not astonishing that he is backing the principle of a secular state and rejects the Islamic
Party22.
25 In some places, shrines may also be in direct conflict with mosques like in the Sunnite
village of Märäzä where in 1997 representatives of the Masğed al-muhābbat al-Maraza23
unsuccessfully tried to make propaganda against the ziyarätgah of Diri Baba24.
26 My impression is that these kind of shrines represent the most popular form of Islam in
Azerbaijan helping the people very much to bear the hardships of a society in transition.
And if a religious entrepreneur organises the shrine properly this,  in the eyes of the
visitors, is also a proof of the “saint's” spiritual power. Visiting shrines is also a form of
expressing religious feelings without getting into conflict with the secular society and the
state.
27 Many representatives of the third layer of Azeri Islam – the self-declared mullahs or religious
leaders - are very much opposed to shrines and to popular religion connected to so-called
non-Islamic behaviour.  Some of them, like Sheykh Äläskär from Ämircan whom I am
going to present here, are physically harassed by followers of the QMİ or Shi'ite Islamist
groups. They themselves are strong enemies of the veneration of shrines and even of the
setting up of graveyards. Besides the religious arguments that there must not exist a
mediator between men and God and that nobody besides God is allowed to be worshipped,
Sheykh Äläskär denounces the official mullahs as well as the shrine guardians as being
nothing  else  than  pure  materialists.  They  in  return  use  the  invective  “Vahabi”  to
denounce their rivals. Sheykh Äläskär with his alleged 500 followers is a typical convert
who found his  way  to  Islam at  the  age  of  about  forty,  learned Arabic  by  self-study
andrejects everything besides the Koran as being a legitimate source for Islamic beliefs.
Besides his charismatic personality and the spiritual needs of the people, an important
cause for his large number of followers seems to be the solidarity ties in his community,
based on the principle of zakat. He could manage to take over and restore a historical
mosque used as storage during the Soviet period which his community defends against
attacks by the local Shi'ite Mosque mullah's followers. An important feature is that he
denounces the differences between Sunni and Shi'a Islam which he sees as a forbidden
innovation to Islam (bidca). Sheykh Äläskär says that he does not have any problem with
the state. Besides passivity on the side of the state apparatus this may be due to the fact
that he objects to the Islamic Party with the argument that it is engaged in politics under
the guise of religion25.
28 When religio-political activities of pro-Iranian tendency in Azerbaijan are discussed, the
Islamic Party of Azerbaijan26 as the most well known and largest group in this respect has
to be presented. The Party – as fourth layer of Azerbaijani Islam – officially registered in
1992, experienced a major blow in May 1996 when its leadership was arrested under the
accusation of spying for Iran and sending youngsters to the Islamic Republic for military
training. It is true that the ideological outlook of this party, whose membership figures
range between 20 000 and 70 000, is very much under Iranian influence and that it is the
sole relevant Azerbaijani party propagating a close relationship with Iran. One of the
main problems of the Party is that it lacks – despite the large number of partly young
followers -substantial support from intellectuals and the middle strata of the Azerbaijani
society. An interesting fact is that the Party has a separate structure for women. Perhaps
due to the harsh persecution by the state which lead to the death of some of the accused
leaders or because of a change in Iranian policy, the currently leading fraction of the
Party tries to show a more moderate face. Instead of propagating an Islamic state they
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have  entered  into  a  dialogue with  other  opposition  parties  to  discuss  co-operation.
Regarding the differences between Shi'ite and Sunnite Islam, one of the Party's leaders
stated in an interview that they are a product of Jewish conspiracy. The main advantage
of the Party has always been that a lot of religious people in Azerbaijan understood the
Islamic Party not as a political party but as the representative of Islam in the public
sphere. However, this image has widely dwindled.
29 The fifth layer of Islam in Azerbaijan are the Muslim intellectuals who also might be seen as
Islamic  modernists.  They  not  only  accept  the  secular  state  and  stand  for  the
democratisation of the society, but re-interpret the main sources of Islam in the light of
the needs of a modern society. For example, the veiling of women is not considered as
being compulsory. With regard to the Sharia they do not believe in its eternal nature and
interpret it  as created by men. Important representatives of this group are:  Näriman
Qasimoğlu, an Arabist who translated the Koran into Azeri and who stands close to the
national-democratic People's Front Party27, and the historian Professor Rafiq Äliyev who
heads İrşad(“Guidance”), the Centre for Islamic Studies. This Centre was officially founded
in November 1990 by a group of orientalists of the Academy of Science to study Islam, its
history and culture as well as its spreading in Azerbaijan and the wider region. irşad is
well  organised,  has  comparably  much money and is  integrated into an international
network of moderate Islamic groupings. Besides the publication of books, textbooks and
journals  (e.g. a  journal  on ‘Islamic  medicine’),  the  Centre  organises  conferences  with
different Arabic, Iranian and Turkish Islamic institutions on topics like human rights in
Islam, women in Islam and the ‘Green Book’ of al-Ghaddafi. Thus, the Centre finances its
activities  by  the  sale  of  publications,  translations,  supervision  of  Arab  students  and
educational activities; Saudi organisations financially supported the new building of the
Centre28.
30 It seems, however, that most of these intellectuals do tend to a puritanic, Sunni-inspired
interpretation of  Islam.  Some of  them like Näriman Qasimoğlu or  Fazil  Gäzänfäroğlu
fiercely reject Shi'ite Islam; they see it as an Iranian distortion of true Islam with pagan
elements. Gäzänfäroğlu even argues that Shi'ite Islam is alien to the Turks and as such
separates  the  “Azerbaijani  Turks”  from  their  Turkish  kin.  A  fine  illustration of
Gäzänfäroğlu's  thinking is  his  comparison of  the return to “real  Islam” with Rodin's
answer when asked how he created his famous statue “Le Penseur”: ‘It was very easy, I
have taken the marble and chipped everything which was there besides the statue and
threw it away’29. This rationalist view of religion and type of argumentation could also be
seen as a Soviet legacy; its puritanism seems quite close to the Islam of the so-called
Vahabis. The main difference is that for these intellectuals only purified Islam can serve
as an agent of modernisation, an argument which is insignificant for a Sheykh Äläskär,
but which leads them also to disapprove popular Islam as ‘unscientific’ and as a distortion
of ‘true Islam’.
31 A matter of discussion is whether even agnostic Muslim intellectuals, active in the field of
religion, might be seen as belonging to this grouping. In Azerbaijan some liberal activists
support the opposition striving to start a dialogue between Islamists and secularists30 and
fighting for religious freedom for the sake of all Azerbaijanis irrespective of their faith.
For instance, they helped to organise “The Religious Women Rights Defence Committee”,
thus  backing strict  Islamic  women claiming for  the  right  of  using photographs  with
covered hair in their passports which, according to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the law, is an illegal practice.
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32 As most Azerbaijanis consider Islam as being part of their national identity despite their
poor knowledge of their traditional religion, these intellectuals might have a considerable
influence in shaping the future outlook of Azerbaijani Islam.
33 A common feature of all these five layers of Azerbaijani Islam is that they minimize the
differences between Sunni and Shi'a Islam and try to find ways to unite the different sects
within Islam.
34 Moreover, the competition for scarce resources adds to the difficulties met by foreign
Islamic  missionaries.  An  Azeri  student  of  theology  in  Ankara  explains  that  these
missionaries  played  a  considerable  role  during  the  first  half  of  the  nineties  when
“volunteer clerics and cemaats from Muslim countries carried out these tasks [religious
propaganda and education] much more than the official structures”31.
35 Discussing the matter of competition, the picture of Islam in Azerbaijan would not be
complete without mentioning the competition between Iranian Shi'ite missionaries and
their Sunni rivals mainly originating from Turkey – sent by the semiofficial Diyanet Vakfi –
or from the Islamic Ecole of the Nurcus, e.g. disciples of Fethullah Gülen (Fethullah Hoca)32.
Most effective in the field of education are semi-official Turkish organisations like the
Diyanet Vakfi which, e.g. founded a theological faculty and opened highschools, modelled
on the Turkish imam-hatip liseleri, in Baku and Nakhichevan33. They came, of course, to an
agreement with the Azerbaijani state.  Turkish religious influence can be seen also in
northern  and  western  Azerbaijan  where  Turkish  organisations  built  mosques  and
provided  religious  personnel  for  a  certain  period.  As  reported  by  an  Azerbaijani
newspaper, in the early nineties, the Turkish Refah Partisi allegedly received 500 000 US$
from Saudi Arabia to finance their activities in Azerbaijan. This information seems to
point to a close co-operation of different religio-political Sunni organisations, with the
objective of gaining influence in the successoring states of the former Soviet Union34.
36 To put it briefly, in the beginning official and semi-official Turkish structures seemed to
make the race. But, during the second half of the 1990s the Turkish position became
weaker. This happened due to the fact that the local believers gradually noticed that
many of the hocas coming from Turkey were propagating Sunni interpretations of Islam
which were in contradiction to their Shi'ite traditions. Some of them openly criticised
Shi'ite popular practices, such as the şaxsey-vaxsey(the mourning about the death of Imam
Hüseyin in Kerbala)35,  which has the potential  to build up an antagonist atmosphere
between  the  adherents  of  both  branches  of  Islam.  Besides,  the  above  mentioned
competition for the scarce resources mainly coming from marriage and funeral  fees,
inevitably  brought  the  Turks  in  conflict  with  local  religious  structures.  At  present,
however, at least eight ‘Turkish’ mosques exist in Azerbaijan. Owing to the fact that there
are no Iranian mosques, we may conclude that Iran's religious position even in Shi'ite
Azerbaijan is quite weak.
37 An important  channel  of  influence  for  foreign  Islamic  organisations  are  the  various
refugee  rescue  organisations  and  the  financial  means  streaming  into  Azerbaijanas
humanitarian aid. In 1996 out of 88 million US$, 2.4 million came from Saudi Arabia, two
million from Iran and one million from Pakistan and Kuwait. Parts of this money are
distributed  by  the  Azerbaijani  state,  other  parts  are  directly  spent  by  foreign
organisations like the Xomeyni Adinda İmdad Komitesi36. One may foresee, however, that the
strengthening of economic ties of foreign Islamists, Islamic companies and organisations,
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with Azerbaijani partners may be a more efficient tool to gain religio-political influence
than full-time missionary activities (37).
38 As presented above,  Islam in Azerbaijan is a multifaceted phenomenon which can be
understood only in the context  of  a  society in transition.  One of  its  most  important
features is the relationship between Shi'ite and Sunnite Islam which is still dominated by
an ecumenical and sometimes eclectic spirit,  while being increasingly beleaguered by
foreign missionaries  on  the  one  hand  and  put  under  pressure  by  the  dynamic
development  of  Azerbaijani  society  on  the  other  hand.  In  conclusion  it  should  be
emphasized that nowadays Islam plays only a very limited role in the political sphere and
that only a small part of the population supports the idea of establishing an ‘Islamic
order’. This is due to the long tradition of secularism in Azerbaijan and to the fact that
the strong nationalistic  movement is  secular in character and sometimes even fights
together with the ruling elite against their rival -political Islam. Yet, on the longer run, if
the political elite of Azerbaijan does not succeed in improving the disastrous conditions
of  life  of  the vast  majority of  the people,  the population may express  its  discontent
through a politicized form of Islam.
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NOTES
*. I  would like  to  thank my Azerbaijani  friends Dr.  Sämäd Mirzoyev for  his  help during my
research stays in 1997 and 1998 and Dr. Hikmet Hadji-zadeh as well as Dr. Näriman Qasimoğlu for
their  helpful  comments  on  several  aspects  of  Azerbaijani  Islam.  Earlier  versions  of  this
contribution were presented at the MESA Convention in Washington, DC (December 3-6, 1998)
and  at  the  International  Conference  The  Twelver  Shia  in  Modern  Times, Freiburg  (Germany)
(October 4-7, 1999) (published under the title Foreign Missionaries, Homemade Dissidents and Popular
islam:  The Search for  New Religious Structures  in Azerbaijan, The Twelver Shia in Modern Times.
Religious Culture and Political History, Rainer BRUNNER, Werner ENDE, eds, Leiden-Boston-Koln,
Brill,  2001,  pp. 284-297).  The  article  is  part  of  a  larger  research  project  on  “Turkish-Islamic
missionary activities and the development of Islam in Southern Caucasia and Tatarstan since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union”.
1.  See  for  example  FAR-Centre Monitoring  Grupu, 1996,  pp. 9-11  and  the  conception  of  the
Azerbaijan  People's  Front  Party  on  Islam:  Azärbaycan  Cämiyyätindä  İslam  Dininin Yerini
Müäyyänläşdirilmäsinä  Dair  Azärbaycan  Xalq  Cäbhäsi  Partiyasinin  Konsepsiyasi, unpublished
manuscript, Baku, 1999.
2.  Cf. the examples presented in Raoul MOTIKA, 2000, pp. 128-140.
3. Because of non-existing statistics these information may only be taken as a guideline. Besides,
the question remains  open whether  the Karabagh Armenians who are nominally  Azerbaijani
citizens have to be included or not.
4.  Alexandre BENNIGSEN, S. Enders WIMBUSH, 1986, p. 139.
5. For detailed information about the ethnic composition of the population and their religious
background see Raoul MOTIKA.
6. Based on oral information given in September 1997 by a staff member of the FAR CENTRE
(Centre of Economic and Political Research, Baku) which conducted several surveys and opinion
polls in 1996 and 1997 comprising questions on religion.
7.  This figure includes the unregistered places of worship ;  some 16 (14 Shi'a,  2 Sunni) were
under the Spiritual  Board's  control,  cf.  Bennigsen and Wimbush,  Muslims of  the  Soviet  Empire,
p. 17f ;  the  given  number  of  200  mosques  includes  unregistered/illegal  places  of  worship.
Compare with the information on the development of the number of mosques given by Abdulla Ä
HÄDOV, 1991, pp. 77, 87.
8. Based on an oral information by the Qafqazya Müsülmanlar İdaräsi. However, the numbers given
by different informants show considerable variations up to 2000 mosques.
9. For detailed information on the history of the “Two Azerbaijans”, cf. Tadeusz SWIETOCHOWSKI
,1995.
10.  Alexandre BENNIGSEN , S. Enders WIMBUSH, op.cit., p. 140f give a figure of 300 major places and
name the most important 14 places of pilgrimage.
11.  Alexandre BENNIGSEN , S. Enders WIMBUSH, op.cit., p. 140.
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12. On  January  7  1996  President  Äliyev  issued  a  decree  forbidding  missionary  activities  of
foreigners (be they Christians, Muslims or adherents of other religion). Cf. Ayna/Zerkalo, n° 36,
469, 7.9.1996.
13. Interview with the leadership of the Party in Baku on September 12, 1997. Cf. also to the
newspapers close to the Party like İslamin Säsi(banned 1996).
14. Besides Islamic and Christian-evangelical missionaries who allegedly converted 2,000 people
to Christianity, there are Bahais and Hare Krishna adherents active in the Republic.
15. According  to  the  head of  the  Committee  for  Religion  at  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the
Republic  of  Azerbaijan  until  December  1997  more  than  250  religious  organisations  were
registered.  Hikmet  Hadjy-zadeh  holds  the  opinion  that  currently  new registrations  are  very
difficult ; cf. Hikmet HADJY-ZADEH, op. cit., p. 3.
16. Besides political  reasons,  financial  ones can also cause severe problems for  the different
religious communities in Azerbaijan ; e.g. Hadjy-zadeh describes the case of alleged bribery of an
official of the Committee for Religion by an activist of Jehova's Whitnesses to receive official
registration which led to a three-years suspended sentence. Hikmet HADJY-ZADEH, 1998, p. 3.
17. Cf. for example the speech of President Äliyev held on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday
in the Täzäpir mosque and published as a booklet with a circulation of 10,000 under the title
Allahin Yolunda Hamimiz Bir Olaq, (Baku, 1993) in two Azeri Turkish versions (one in Cyrillic, the
other  in  Arabic  script),  in  Russian  and  in  English  accompanied  by  some  photos.  For  the
problematic relationship between the state leadership and Islam cf. EXPERTS GROUP, 1995, pp. 1-2.
18.  The topic ‘women and Islam in Azerbaijan’ is treated by Nayereh TOHIDI, 1998, pp. 137-161 ;
Nayereh TOHIDI, 1997, pp. 147-167 ; Tamara DRAGADZE, 1994, pp. 152-163.
19. According to an information given by the Şeyhülislam beginning of July 1999.
20. The fees asked from the population are a steady point of complaint. Even Abdülkadir Sezgin,
the  Turkish  author  of  a  Baku-published  volume  propagating  Islam,  sharply  criticizes  profit-
seeking Azeri clergymen. Cf. Abdülkadir SEZGIN, 1994, p. 21.
21. E.g. in the Göy Mäscidi of Baku.
22. Interview with Hacı Nizam in Şövälan on September 21 1997.
23. Built by He 'yat al-ā 'māl al-hayriyyet.
24. Based on an oral information by a local.
25. Interview with Sheykh Äläskär on September 18 1997.
26.  The Azärbaycan İslam Partiyasi was founded at September 2 1991 and one year later officially
registered (22.9.92), cf. İsmayil VÄLIYEV, Cavid HÜSEYNOV, 1995, p. 16 ; in 1995 the registration was
withdrawn on the grounds of mixing politics with religion. During their arrest some of the Party
leaders died in prison under questionable circumstances ; cf. e.g. Ayna/Zerkalo, n° 22 (445), June 1
1996  and  n° 24  (560),  June  20  1998 ;  Hürriyet, Baku,  n° 69  (227),  September  19  1997. For  the
political ideas and the programme of the Party cf. Azürbaycan İslam Partiyasinin (AİP) Märamnamä
vä  Nizamnamäsi, 1997,  and  the  different  issues  of  Häblullah.  Azärbaycan  İslam  Partiyasinin
İnformasiya  Märkäzinin  Bülleteni, until  1996  the  Party's  newspaper  İslamin  Säsimay  also  be
consulted. More recent developments in the Party are described by HADJY-ZADEH, « Freedom of
Belief »,  pp. 4-6.  An  interview  with  some  leaders  of  the  Party  was  made  by  the  author  on
September 13 1997.
27. He  regularly  publishes  articles  on  religious  topics  in  the  widely  circulated  opposition
newspaper Azadliq ; some of them are collected in his book Ayä Aydmliğunda, Baku, 1999.
28. Baki, July 11, 1992.
29. Fazil GEZENFEROĞLU, n.d. (post 1997), pp. 359f.
30. A  product  of  such a  conference  is  the  special  issue  of  the  journal  III  Era.  Meždunarodnyj
Ežekvartalnyj Analitičeskij Žurnal, n° 3 (3), 1998, Äqidä Azadliği vä Dövlät ; Din ve Siyasät/Freedom of
Belief: Religion & Polilics/Svoboda Sovesti ; Religija i Politika (Baku, 1998).
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31.  Gençlerin Gözüyle Türk Dünyasimn Dinî Meseleleri (Forum), 1998, p. 21.
32.  On  Turkish  activities  cf.  Jean  NOSEBE,  1999,  pp. 385-402.  For  a  Turkish-Islamic  view  of
religious co-operation and missionary activities cf. Sabahaddin ZAIM, 1997, esp. pp. 105-114.
33. Gençlerin Gözüyle..., p. 85.
34. Azadliq, n° 156 (907),  2.8.1997.  The article is  based on a report by the Turkish newspaper
Sabah.
35.  Sezgin, Mänim Dinim, pp. 34f. I thank Volker Adam for drawing my attention to this point.
36.  Ayna/Zerkalo, n° 31 (516), 9.8.1997.
ABSTRACTS
Islam in Azerbaijan is a multifaceted phenomenon which can be understood only in the context
of  a  society  in  transition.  One  of  the  most  important  problems  of  Azerbaijani  Islam  is  the
relationship between Shi'ism and Sunnite Islam which is still dominated by an ecumenical and
sometimes eclectic spirit. This situation is increasingly beleaguered by foreign missionaries on
the one hand and put under pressure by the dynamic development of Azerbaijani society on the
other hand. Nowadays Islam plays only a very limited role in the political sphere and only a small
part of the population supports the idea of establishing an ‘Islamic order'. This is due to the long
tradition of secularism in Azerbaijan and to the fact that the strong nationalistic movement is
secular in character and sometimes even fights together with the ruling elite against their rival,
political Islam. But, on the longer run and if the political elite of Azerbaijan does not succeed in
improving the disastrous standard of living of the vast majority of the people, the population
may express its discontent through a politicized form of Islam.
L'islam en Azerbaïdjan représente un phénomène complexe qu'on ne peut comprendre que dans
le contexte d'une société en transition. L'un des problèmes les plus importants de l'islam en
Azerbaïdjan est celui des relations entre I'islam sunnite et I'islam shiite qui sont encore dominées
par un esprit œcuménique et parfois éclectique. La situation est menacée par les missionnaires
étrangers d'un côté et la pression d'une société en transition dynamique de l'autre. Aujourd'hui,
l'islam joue un rôle peu important dans le domaine politique, et la majorité de la population de
l'Azerbaïdjan ne favorise pas l'établissement d'un « ordre islamique ». Cela est dû à une longue
tradition de sécularisation en Azerbaïdjan et au fait que le puissant mouvement nationaliste est
lui-même sécularisé, et lutte côte à côte avec l'élite gouvernementale contre leur rival commun,
l'islam politique. Mais, à long terme, et surtout si l'élite politique n'arrive pas à élever le niveau
de vie, lamentable à l'heure actuelle, de la grande majorité de la population, celle-ci pourrait
exprimer son mécontentement sous forme d'un intégrisme islamique.
El Islam en Azerbaijan representa un fenómeno complejo que solo puede ser comprendido en el
contexto de una sociedad en transición. Uno de los fenómenos más importantes del Islam en
Azerbaijan es el  de las  relaciones entre el  Islam sunnita y  el  Islam chiíta,  entre los  que aún
prevalece un espíritu ecuménico, y a veces aún ecléctico. La situación es tanto más grave en tanto
hay misioneros extranjeros por un lado, y la presión de una sociedad en transición dinámica por
el otro. Hoy, el Islam juega un rol poco importante en el ámbito politico, y la mayor parte de la
población de Azerbaijan no es partidaria del establecimiento de un « orden islámico ». Esto se
debe a una larga tradición de secularización en Azerbaijan, y al hecho de que incluso el potente
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movimiento nacionalista está secularizado, y lucha codo a codo con la elite gubernamental contra
el rival común, el Islam politico. Pero a largo plazo, y sobre todo si la elite política no llega a
elevar el nivel de vida de la gran mayoría de la población, lamentable en el momento actual, esta
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